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Abstract 
 
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the relationship between income inequality 
and growth. We use the WIDER/UNDP World Income Inequality Database to investigate the 
effects of inequality and trade liberalisation on growth in a sample of exclusively developing 
countries. Cross-section (long-run) and panel (short run) techniques are used to test for the 
effect of inequality on growth controlling for other variables (initial GDP, endowments, 
investment, human capital and natural barriers to trade). We find consistent evidence for a 
negative effect of inequality on growth in the long run but no significant effect in the short 
run. Trade liberalisation appears to have a consistent and significant positive association with 
growth. These results are quite robust to the inclusion of alternative control variables, and we 
find no evidence of any interaction affect between inequality and trade liberalisation. We also 
find consistent evidence that countries relatively endowed with land (and thus dependent on 
primary commodity exports) and/or that face high natural barriers to trade experience lower 
growth rates. There is also evidence that, controlling for most other variables, sub-Saharan 
African countries experience below average growth performance; however, accounting for 
trade restrictions and natural barriers seems to eliminate this effect. The evidence suggests 
that inequality is an important factor in explaining low growth in developing countries over 
the long run. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Research on the determinants of growth in developing countries has become concerned with 
possible linkages between policy reform, growth and inequality. Forbes (2000), in particular, 
has injected new life into analysis of the effect of inequality on growth. In principle, the 
relationship between inequality and growth may be in either direction – most analysis 
considers inequality as a determinant of growth, although growth may influence inequality. 
Empirically, there is no consistent evidence that growth (or the lack of it) affects within-
country inequality on average (Ravallion, 2001). Milanovic (2002) shows that although 
global inequality rose between 1988 and 1993, this was due almost completely to an increase 
in inequality between countries, while within-country inequality was largely unaffected. If 
globalisation affects world inequality it is most likely to be because of differential growth 
rates between countries. We consider the extent to which initial inequality is a factor 
explaining growth differences. 
 
Our aim is to explore the inequality-growth relationship for a sample of developing countries 
only. We use data that has recently been made available in the World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID, compiled by UNDP and WIDER) to construct a panel of 44 developing 
countries, including countries from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This sample benefits from 
being somewhat less heterogeneous than studies combining developed and developing 
countries, and we can be reasonably confident of the validity of pooling the countries in the 
cross-section regressions (and do test for outliers). However, we have the problem of 
including many poor performing economies whose growth is difficult to model, in particular 
SSA countries. 
 
The conventional view is that income inequality tends to be associated with (or even a proxy 
for) inequalities in the distribution of power. High inequality will be associated with 
distortions in the economy, such as high levels of protection, and incentives for rent-seeking 
behaviour. These in turn tend to reduce growth. Thus, inequality and restrictive trade policies 
will tend to be correlated, at least in the long-run, and both associated with lower growth. 
Trade liberalisation is an indicator of economic policy reform in which distortions are 
reduced and market incentives increased. Whilst inequality may discourage liberalisation, 
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once trade liberalisation actually occurs it is expected to reduce the negative impact of 
inequality on growth.  
Income inequality may have a direct effect in retarding growth. That is, an unequal 
distribution of income may mean that the majority of the population does not share in the 
benefits of growth, hence the incentives to them to contribute to growth are muted (e.g. 
weaker incentives to work harder or be entrepreneurial). This would be an ‘anti trickle down’ 
view of growth, but is consistent with some of the evidence for East Asia – that ‘shared 
growth’ encourages dynamism and effort (Morrissey and Nelson, 1998). Trade liberalisation 
should promote growth as it increases the efficiency of the economy, but the effect on 
inequality is ambiguous. Workers may shift from declining (import competing) to expanding 
(exporting) sectors, without any change in the overall level of income inequality. In this case 
there need not be a direct effect of trade liberalisation on the inequality-growth relationship. 
 
An alternative view is that income inequality is representative of other distortions in the 
economy, and can be used as a proxy measure for these growth-retarding features of the 
economy. In an economy where power is concentrated, distortions are widespread and rent-
seeking is prevalent, we may expect to observe relatively high levels of inequality (and 
relatively poor growth performance). In such a case, trade liberalisation is a signal of policy 
reform that reduces (some) distortions. Consequently, trade liberalisation in this view will 
alter the nature of the inequality-growth relationship. It need not affect the level of inequality, 
although one would expect inequality to fall as distortions are reduced and incentives 
increased. 
 
This review addresses a number of questions. Are poorer countries more unequal and do more 
unequal countries grow more slowly, i.e. is inequality negatively related to growth? Is there a 
difference between the long and short run effects of income inequality on growth in 
developing countries? Cross-country regressions based on period overall growth and averages 
for explanatory variables can be interpreted as capturing the ‘long-run’ aggregate relationship. 
Panel-data techniques, using sub-period values for variables, can capture the ‘short-run’ 
nature of the inequality-growth relationship. This follows Forbes (2000) who, in a sample 
including industrialised countries but with few low-income countries, found that inequality 
was negatively associated with growth in the long-run, but the association was positive in the 
short-run. We consider whether this holds for developing countries. 
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Section 2 provides a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
inequality on growth. Section 3 presents a brief discussion of the data and specifications used 
in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results for the cross-section, or long-run, relationship, 
and finds evidence that inequality does appear to reduce growth, controling for trade variables 
(openness, natural endowments and natural barriers). Section 5 extends this analysis with 
panel estimates to explore the short-run aspects of the relationships. Trade liberalisation is 
found to have a positive effect on growth, but this effect is dampened if natural barriers are 
high and/or if inequality is high. Section 6 concludes by relating our evidence to the theories 
outlined in the second section.  
 
2 A Brief Overview the Literature 
 
Most of the theoretical economics literature posits that inequality has a negative impact on 
growth. There are four general categories of model that explain how an unequal initial 
distribution of assets and income can affect growth. For convenience these can be termed 
political economy, social conflict, credit market and X-inefficiency models. 
 
The political economy argument is premised on the median voter model (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Bertola 1993; Partridge, 1997; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). The greater 
the inequality shown by the distance between the mean per capita national income and the 
median income of the eligible voters, the lower will be growth. The logic is that political 
decisions to redistribute income are more likely to be made when inequality is greater, 
and will result in economic policies that tax investment and growth-promoting activities. 
These models assume both implicit, if not actual, democracy and that redistribution is 
implemented in a way that reduces growth. This hardly seems an appropriate way to 
represent the majority of developing countries over the past three decades. The underlying 
mechanism is that in order to maintain support the political elite redistributes income and 
in doing so reduce the return on capital. There is little evidence for this in developing 
countries. The successful East Asian economies implemented redistribution via land 
reform, public spending or real wages, rather than by discouraging investment (Morrissey 
and Nelson, 1998). Few African or Latin American countries have redistributed income. 
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The social conflict approach observes that an unequal distribution of resources is a source 
of political tension and social conflict. In such a socio-political environment, property 
rights are insecure and this discourages accumulation. The higher is the gap between the 
rich and the poor, the greater is the temptation to engage in rent seeking and this in turn 
reduces investment and constrains the ability of the government to respond to shocks 
(Benabou, 1996; Rodrik, 1998). Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that greater inequality 
leads to less political stability and consequently sub-optimal investment levels.2 Nafziger 
and Auvinen (2002) report that high inequality is a determinant of conflict and 
humanitarian emergencies. 
 
The credit markets channel (Tsiddon, 1992) is underpinned by the fact that investments 
are lumpy and access to credit depends on the existence of collateral. Consequently, there 
is a credit constraint stemming from unequal initial distribution of assets, and this hinders 
growth. In this context, inequality of land holdings represents a constraint on growth in 
the agriculture sector, typically the major productive sector in poor developing countries. 
A related argument is that greater income equality encourages human capital 
accumulation, as there are fewer liquidity constraints and investment in human capital is 
lumpy (Chiu, 1998). 
 
The fourth approach is based on the argument that high inequality reduces the X-
efficiency of workers. X-efficiency refers to a measure of workers’ productivity holding 
constant all other inputs into the production process including workers’ skills 
(Leibenstein, 1966, cited in Birdsall et al, 1995). Workers’ productivity is limited by a 
‘virtual’ glass ceiling as they do not visualise themselves progressing beyond a certain 
point and this discourages effort and perpetuates a vicious cycle of low incomes and 
therefore high inequality. Thus, inequality has a disincentive effect that retards growth.  
 
In all of these theories inequality has a disincentive effect that retards growth. The first three 
approaches are accumulation-based and long run in nature; they relate inequality to growth in 
an indirect way, via investment. This fourth theory relates to incentives and labour 
                                                           
2 A number of recent studies provide evidence that political instability reduces growth in SSA (Gyimah-
Brempong and Traynor, 1999; Guillaumont et al, 1999). 
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productivity, rather than investment and accumulation. As such, this can be viewed as a direct 
effect of inequality on growth that should be apparent even over the relatively short run.  
 
Empirical Evidence on Inequality and Growth 
The 1990s has seen a growing interest in research on whether inequality retards growth. Most 
empirical work has relied on the Gini coefficient or income shares as measures of inequality. 
Mbabazi et al (2001) summarise a range of studies, and the principal findings are: 
•= There is general evidence for a negative effect of inequality on economic growth, 
although this result is not robust in all specifications (Birdsall et al, 1995). Benabou 
(1996: Table 2) summarises a range of studies and shows that the balance of evidence is 
for a negative and significant relationship. 
•= Land inequality tends to have a more robust (negative) influence on growth than income 
inequality (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Birdsall and Londono, 1997; Deininger and Squire, 
1998). 
•= There is evidence, at least for developed countries, for a positive, significant and robust 
relationship between inequality and growth in the medium and short run, that is, higher 
inequality is associated with higher growth (Forbes, 2000). This is in contrast to the 
evidence for a negative relationship in the long run. 
 
The differences in the results from studies of the inequality-growth relationship can be largely 
attributed to four factors – differences in sample coverage, time period, data quality and 
estimation methods. Forbes (2000) sample includes no sub-Saharan African country and half 
of the sample comprises OECD countries. About half of the countries in the samples used by 
Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (1999), Banerjee and Duflo (2001) are developing. The 
evidence suggests that the relationship is different for OECD as compared with developing 
countries. For this reason we use a sample of developing countries only. 
 
Almost all studies before 1996 are based on long period averages for a cross-section of 
countries, and thus capture any ‘long-run’ relationship. Later studies use the Deininger and 
Squire (1996) data that includes many developing countries and permits the construction of 
panels to address short-run issues. Forbes (2000) is the innovative study that uses sub-period 
panels to examine the ‘short-run’ relationship. We extend this analysis to a sample of 
developing countries. 
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Data quality is always a problem for econometric analysis of developing countries, and is 
especially acute regarding inequality. The Deininger and Squire (1996) database is widely 
accepted as one of the most reliable sources of data on inequality (and is included in the WIID 
data source we draw on). Knowles (2001) provides a critical discussion of this data, 
demonstrating that the use of income as against expenditure based measures biases the 
results. Nevertheless, as being the most widely comparable data available, we use the WIID 
data. 
 
Another reason for differences in results could be the estimation methods. Cross-section 
estimation methods have many weaknesses, documented by, among others, Levine and Renelt 
(1992). The use of panel estimation methods to control for country and time specific effects 
has been precluded by the paucity of good quality data. Forbes (2000) stands out in this 
regard. Banarjee and Duflo (2000) present a sophisticated econometric analysis of the 
relationship between inequality and growth, allowing for a non-linear relationship and 
accounting for country-specific differences. They find no evidence of a consistent relationship 
between the level of inequality and growth; much depends on the data and sample used, and 
the other control variables included. However, their principal results are that changes in 
inequality, in any direction, tend to have a negative effect on growth and that inequality 
changes are less in those countries with higher initial levels of inequality. They find that 
lagged inequality has a negative impact on growth in those countries where inequality is 
relatively low (perhaps because it is more likely to change in such cases).  
 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that there is likely to be a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth in the long run, although this may not be the case 
in the short-run. Research on the inequality-growth relationship has tended not to include 
SSA countries in the sample, nor has the potential role of trade and trade policy been 
explored. As trade liberalisation is an indicator of economic policy shifting to a market-
oriented regime with greater incentives, it should have a positive impact on growth. There 
may be interactions between inequality and trade policy that should be taken into account. On 
the one hand, the beneficial effects of trade liberalisation may be less in countries with high 
inequality (as the incentive effects are not transmitted widely). On the other hand, whilst 
inequality changes slowly, trade liberalisation policies can be implemented relatively quickly 
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and may provide an impetus for reduced inequality. Thus, we expect to observe effects of 
inequality and trade liberalisation on growth, and of some interaction between the two. 
 
3 Data and Empirical Specification 
 
The analysis is based on data for 44 developing countries over the period 1970-95 (details on 
data and sources are provided in the Appendix). Our dependent variable is growth in per 
capita GDP (GROWTH). The growth literature points to the importance of initial values in 
explaining subsequent growth, and these are captured by the initial value of real GDP 
(GDP0). The additional variables are measures of the increases in the stock variables. The 
increase in the capital stock is captured by the average rate of investment (INV). Secondary 
school enrolment (SEC, the average over the whole period) is the proxy for investment in 
human capital. 
 
As our concern is specifically with inequality, the basic specification estimated, similar to that 
used in most empirical work in this area (Perotti, 1996, Forbes, 2000), is: 
  
GROWTH = β0  + β1GINI + β2GDP0 + β3SEC + β4INV + µ   (1) 
 
If initial income (GDP0) captures convergence the expected sign is negative. However, in a 
cross-country regression it may capture country-specific initial conditions, and the sign could 
be positive. The coefficient on GINI is expected to be negative. The coefficients on SEC and 
INV are expected to have positive signs. Note that this measure of human capital is aggregate, 
and not broken down by gender, nor do we include the purchasing power parity of the 
investment deflator relative to that in the United States as a proxy for market distortion (but 
we do use an measure of trade policy distortion). The variables included above are widely 
accepted as core explanatory variables. 
 
To this basic specification we then add other variables believed to be important in the 
inequality-growth relation. Obviously, the potential list is large, but we limit the number 
included for reasons similar to those advanced by Forbes (2000) and Perroti (1996), namely; 
the need to maximise degrees of freedom given the limited availability of inequality data and 
to facilitate comparability between studies. We include a dummy variable for SSA to test if 
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there is an ‘Africa effect’ in our sample. We then include a measure of natural resource 
endowment (NRE) to capture important structural features of the economy. The underlying 
hypothesis is that countries with relatively low endowments of natural resources, thus 
relatively high labour endowments, will need to industrialise to promote export growth and 
avail of their comparative advantage (Mayer and Wood, 2001). However, countries endowed 
with natural resources will tend to have export dependence on primary commodities. This can 
retard growth both because extractive industries have weak linkages with the rest of the 
economy (or agricultural exports are largely unprocessed) and because primary commodities 
tend to face deteriorating terms of trade. This may help, in particular, to explain Africa’s poor 
growth performance (Wood and Mayer, 2001). Countries with higher NRE values are 
predicted to exhibit slower growth. 
 
Then we include two trade variables. There is a large literature on the relationship between 
trade policy and growth, and the difficulties of measuring trade stance are well known (see 
Edwards, 1993, 1998; Greenaway et al, 1998; Milner and Morrissey, 1999; Rodrik, 1992, 
1998, 1999). Given the problems of measuring openness we use one of the more widely 
accepted measures, the proportion of years between 1965 and 1990 that an economy could be 
considered open (OPEN), from Sachs and Warner (1997). This measure has demonstrated 
robustness in empirical studies (Harrison, 1996; Edwards, 1998). We also include by the ratio 
of cif unit import prices to fob prices as a measure of natural barriers to trade (NBT). There is 
recent evidence that high transactions costs to trade can be a constraint on growth, and in 
particular can limit the beneficial effects of trade liberalisation (Milner et al, 2000).  
 
It is likely that some of these variables will be correlated and, indeed, that there may be 
important interaction effects between some of them. One might expect a high correlation 
between initial GDP and inequality as it has often been argued that the more unequal 
countries are also the poorer countries. The data does not provide sufficient evidence for this 
proposition in our sample - the correlation coefficient is very low at –0.067. However, there is 
a relatively high correlation (above 0.5) between SEC and both GDP0 and INV. As the 
correlation between GDP0 and INV is relatively low (0.15), it is likely that the coefficient on 
SEC will not be significant. Similarly, there is a relatively high correlation between NRE and 
NTB (0.38), both of which tend to have growth-reducing effects. This suggests a ‘double 
whammy’ in that countries with the highest transport costs also tend to export primary 
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commodities (for which transport costs are likely to be a higher share of value). We note that 
NRE has much higher variance. 
 
4 Cross-section (long-run) Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results from estimating the basic specification of equation (1). 
Investment is the principal ‘driver’ of growth, although our human capital variable is not 
significant. While growth may itself be a determinant of investment, implying potential 
endogeneity, our use of the average investment/GDP ratio implies that this should not be a 
serious problem for overall period growth rates. The coefficient on GINI is found to be 
negative, i.e. higher inequality results in lower growth. This result is quite robust in the three 
specifications reported. We also find that the dummy for SSA countries (SSA) has a negative 
highly significant coefficient that is independent of inequality. The coefficient on initial GDP 
is weakly significant only when SSA is included and SEC excluded, suggesting collinearity 
between these three variables. As SEC is not significant, this is the variable we choose to drop 
(regression 1.3), in line with other studies, such as Clarke (1995) and Deininger and Squire 
(1996). This implies that the coefficient on GINI includes any indirect effect of income 
inequality on growth through its effect on education (Knowles, 2001). 
 
   
 
12
12
Table 1: Cross-section Regressions for Growth: Base Specification 
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
GINI -0.050** 
(-2.41) 
-0.040* 
(-2.00) 
-0.039* 
(-1.91) 
GDP0 -0.0005 
(-1.56) 
-0.0004 
(-1.28) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.70) 
SEC 0.021 
(0.98) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
 
INV 0.272*** 
(6.53) 
0.262*** 
(6.44) 
0.270*** 
(7.02) 
SSA  -1.298** 
(-2.53) 
-1.387*** 
(-3.05) 
R2 (adj) 0.572 0.602 0.612 
N 42 42 42 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios: *** denotes significant at 1 percent level, **  significant 
at 5 percent and *  significant at 10 percent. The F-test supports the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly significant (i.e. rejects the null that all are zero). SEC is not 
significant even if initial GDP omitted. Diagnostic tests (the Breusch Pagan (BP) 
heterosecdasticity test, Durbin Watson (DW) correlation test and Jarque-Bera (JB) test on 
residuals for normality) reveal no evidence of serial correlation or heteroscedasticity. The 
normality assumption of the error term is not violated and tests support the functional 
form used. The inclusion of GINI2 does not provide evidence for a non-linear relationship. 
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Table 2: Cross-section Regressions with Openness 
 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
GINI -0.025* 
(-2.01) 
-0.045** 
(-2.59) 
-0.027** 
(-2.16) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.95) 
GDP0 -0.0004* 
(-1.91) 
-0.0004 
(-1.50) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.66) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.19) 
SEC 0.014 
(0.79) 
0.010 
(0.41) 
0.017 
(1.22) 
0.014 
(0.77) 
INV 0.247*** 
(7.31) 
0.236*** 
(5.59) 
0.187*** 
(4.40) 
0.160*** 
(3.17) 
SSA -1.158** 
(-2.70) 
-1.085** 
(-2.11) 
-0.883** 
(-2.48) 
-0.707 
(-1.54) 
NRE -0.039*** 
(-5.00) 
 -0.039*** 
(-8.65) 
 
NBT  -8.485** 
(-2.57) 
 -11.149*** 
(-3.48) 
OPEN   2.026*** 
(4.08) 
2.292*** 
(3.48) 
R2 (adj) 0.722 0.621 0.793 0.709 
N 42 42 42 42 
Notes: As for Table 1. Further details available on request. 
 
We then introduce the ‘resource’ variables (NRE and NBT), and the results are in Table 2 
(regressions 2.1 and 2.2). The coefficient on each is negative and significant when included 
separately. If both are included together only NRE is significant; the most plausible 
explanation for this is that the correlation coefficient between them is reasonably high (0.38) 
and the NRE variable has a greater magnitude and much higher variance. We experimented 
with interaction terms but these were not significant. The coefficient on GINI and the SSA 
dummy remain negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient on GINI is lower 
when NRE is included rather than NBT. It appears that NRE captures some of the negative 
effects associated with inequality. This is consistent with the argument that inequality of 
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ownership of resources, such as land, is greater than income inequality, and will tend to have 
a greater (negative) effect on growth when NRE is high.3 
 
The final two columns of Table 2 include a variable for the orientation of the trade regime. 
The results in regressions (2.3) and (2.4) show that the coefficient on OPEN is positive and 
significant. Thus, openness is conducive to growth. The inclusion of OPEN adds to the 
explanatory power of the regression and does not affect the coefficients on other variables, 
except that the coefficients on INV and SSA are smaller. These results suggest that part of the 
positive effect of INV is due to openness, while part of the ‘negative SSA effect’ is due to 
those countries being closed. Note that the SSA dummy remains negative and significant 
except in regression (2.4), in which the coefficient on NBT is large and highly significant. The 
SSA countries will all have low values of OPEN, although accounting for this alone does not 
eliminate the ‘SSA effect’. Similarly, most SSA countries will tend to have high natural 
barriers, but this alone does not explain the negative effect. The two combined, however, 
appear to eliminate the significance of the SSA dummy. A possible interpretation is that 
openness provides less benefit to SSA countries because they face high natural barriers.  
 
This section used cross-section estimation methods, acknowledging the shortcomings 
highlighted by Levine and Renelt (1992), to explore the effect of inequality on growth in 
developing countries. The results should not be considered in terms of the magnitude of the 
inequality effect on growth, rather they should be considered as an indication of the direction 
of the aggregate long-run effect. While there may be an omitted variable bias, we note that the 
coefficient estimates and significance levels appear quite robust. Furthermore, a number of 
control variables are used. Endogeneity of inequality is not a problem as we are using the 
initial value of the Gini but period growth. Similarly, as the dependent variable is long-term 
growth it is unlikely that endogeneity of other explanatory variables is a problem. 
 
5 Panel Data (short-run) Estimates 
 
                                                           
3 For a smaller sample, we ran the regression using a measure of inequality of land ownership; the results were 
broadly similar, although there is evidence that land inequality has a greater negative association with growth 
than income inequality. 
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We now turn to panel estimation methods to investigate the short run effects of inequality on 
growth, and the relationship of this to trade liberalisation. A panel is constructed of five 5-
year time periods running from 1970-74 to 1990-1994. A sub-set of the countries in the cross-
section analysis is used (determined by data availability). Investment is Gross Domestic 
Investment as a percentage of GDP averaged over the five year period (GDIP). The GINI is 
income inequality at the start of the five-year period, or as near to then as available (from 
WIID). A period dummy (PDum) is used for 1980-94, during which most of the sample was 
engaged in structural adjustment (including, for many, trade liberalisation). Starting income is 
measured as the log of initial GDP (GDP0) in each period. Initial period NRE and NBT values 
were also calculated. These variables constitute the base specification for the panel. 
 
We are particularly concerned about the effect of trade liberalisation, and include this having 
controlled for the other variables in the base specification. The indicator of the timing of trade 
liberalisation used is the Sachs and Warner (1997) index, a dummy variable taking a value of 
1 for each year beginning from the year when liberalisation is said to have occurred and 0 
before this.4  We augment the Sachs-Warner index (SWaug) to add another five countries 
using our judgement of when they liberalised (see Appendix).5  A criticism of dating 
liberalisation at a particular year is that it will take time for effects to occur, but note that we 
are concerned only with the period of liberalisation. 
 
                                                           
4 We also tried the World Bank and Dean indicators used in Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998), but the 
coefficients were insignificant in almost all specifications. We are grateful to Peter Wright for providing the 
data. 
5 Only results using SWaug are reported as this gives the largest sample. The smaller panel using SW was 
estimated and results were very similar. 
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Table 3: Panel Regressions with Trade Liberalisation 
 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) 
GINI 0.0006 
(1.361) 
0.0007* 
(1.658) 
0.0006 
(1.412) 
GDP0 -0.0211** 
(-2.369) 
-0.0223*** 
(-2.630) 
-0.0230*** 
(-2.711) 
GDIP 0.0020*** 
(3.501) 
0.0024*** 
(4.379) 
0.0023*** 
(4.413) 
SWaug  0.0199*** 
(3.416) 
0.0219*** 
(3.644) 
NRE   0.0015 
(1.282) 
NBT -0.0885 
(-0.918) 
-0.0907 
(-0.989) 
-0.1289 
(-1.341) 
PDum -0.0083* 
(-1.791) 
-0.1581*** 
(-3.215) 
-0.0129** 
(-2.379) 
R2 (adj) 0.401 0.459 0.463 
N 145 145 145 
Estimator FEM FEM FEM 
Notes: As for Table 1. A Lagrange Multiplier test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
classical regression model is appropriate against an alternative of fixed or random 
effects. The Hausman test was used to choose between Random Effects (REM) and 
Fixed Effects (FEM) models. Variants of were tested with NRE (always 
insignificant) in place of NBT but other coefficients were largely unaffected. 
  
Results are reported in Table 3. The coefficient on GINI is positive although only (weakly) 
significant in one case (3.2). We find only weak evidence in support of Forbes (2000), that 
inequality appears to be conducive to growth in the short-run. As previously, investment is a 
major determinant of growth, and there is evidence for convergence within the sample. The 
coefficients on NBT and NRE are insignificant. We find robust evidence that trade 
liberalisation, as measured by the SWaug index, is associated with increased growth. Note 
that the period dummy (PDum) has a negative coefficient, implying that liberalisation offsets 
some other negative effect on growth. This suggests that there is an unobserved effect that 
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tended to reduce growth in the 1980s (failure to account for this may be a reason why other 
studies do not find a positive effect of liberalisation). The insignificance of NRE in the panel 
may be because it is largely time-invariant and other variables pick up any related country-
specific effects. Similarly, NBT does not vary much over time. 
 
The regressions in Table 3 may be mis-specified as GDIP is likely to be endogenous, i.e. 
growth is a determinant of average investment rates during each period. To address this we 
replace GDIP with SECR (vale at start of period to proxy for the productivity of investment), 
as enrolment will not be as responsive to growth as investment within a period. Endogeneity 
of inequality does not appear to be a problem – growth does not appear to be a determinant of 
changes in inequality (results available on request) and the coefficient on inequality is mostly 
insignificant in Table 3. To explore the possibility that the growth-retarding effect of 
inequality may be conditional on liberalisation we construct an interactive term (PR), where P 
is the SWaug index and R = (100-GINI)/100. Thus, PR is zero if a country has not liberalised 
and, once the country does liberalise, approaches one as inequality decreases. The hypothesis 
is that liberalisation dampens any adverse effects of inequality by removing distortions in 
resource allocation. To address possible interaction between trade liberalisation and natural 
barriers we constructed an interactive term PT, where P is SWaug and T is the reciprocal of 
NBT. Thus, PT is zero if countries have not liberalised and, once countries do liberalise, 
approaches unity as natural barriers fall. The results are in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Panel Regressions with Interactive Terms 
 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) 
GINI 0.00004 
(0.145) 
-0.0001 
(-0.400) 
-0.0001 
(0.395) 
SECR 0.0053*** 
(2.962) 
0.0004** 
(2.574) 
0.0004** 
(2.609) 
GDP0 -0.0077** 
(-2.086) 
-0.0077** 
(-2.500) 
-0.0077** 
(-2.490) 
SWaug  0.1781*** 
(3.479) 
0.0181*** 
(3.539) 
NBT -0.1407** 
(-2.217) 
-0.1134** 
(-2.010) 
-0.1127** 
(-1.996) 
PR  0.0025 
(0.855) 
 
PT   0.0010 
(0.654) 
PDum -0.0239*** 
(-4.952) 
-0.0294*** 
(-5.861) 
-0.0294*** 
(-5.858) 
R2 (adj) 0.206 0.244 0.243 
N 140 140 140 
Estimator REM POLS POLS 
Notes: As for Table 3. Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests were used to choose between 
pooled OLS specification (POLS), FEM and REM.  Further results available on request. 
 
 
There is robust evidence of convergence, and that countries with higher levels of human 
capital tend to exhibit higher rates of growth (picking up the investment effect). There is also 
robust evidence that growth performance was generally poor in the 1980-94 period, due to 
factors not specified in our model (the coefficient on PDum is consistently negative and 
significant). The evidence that trade liberalisation is associated with higher growth appears 
robust: the coefficient on SWaug is positive and significant. The evidence on the effect of 
NBT is also robust: natural barriers have a negative and significant association with growth. 
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The coefficient on GINI is consistently negative but insignificant in all regressions. Neither 
interactive term is significant, i.e. neither PR nor PT add to the explanatory power of SWaug. 
There is no evidence of any interaction between liberalisation and inequality.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper uses cross-section and panel econometric techniques to investigate the links 
between growth, inequality and trade liberalisation for a sample of developing countries. 
There are three broad conclusions. First, within the sample, there is no evidence that those 
countries that are initially poorer are also more unequal. Second, inequality appears to have a 
negative effect on growth in the long run, although we find no evidence for a short run effect. 
This negative effect persists when we control for factors that promote growth (investment, 
education and openness), factors that retard growth (natural resource endowments and 
barriers to trade), and initial GDP (for which there is evidence of convergence). Third, Africa 
does appear to be different – even allowing for the other explanatory variables, SSA countries 
have a below average growth performance.  
 
Although some results are sensitive to specification, the pattern of results for panel estimates 
is similar to that for the cross section. Investment is the ‘driver’ of growth, and there is 
evidence of convergence in the sample. Trade liberalisation tends to have a positive 
association with growth. High natural barriers to trade tend to be associated with lower 
growth, but there is no evidence that the benefits of liberalisation are less when barriers are 
high. However, we only find evidence for a significant effect of inequality on growth in the 
long-run; the coefficient on GINI is insignificant in most panel regressions. 
 
The four theories proposed to explain the relationship between inequality and growth in 
Section 2 can now be evaluated against the evidence in this paper.  
 
The political economy models are all premised on some version of an argument that 
inequality encourages redistribution policies that then reduce growth. An implication is 
that inequality that leads to redistribution reduces growth but should also reduce future 
inequality. There is no convincing evidence for this. Banerjee and Duflo (2001) find that 
inequality tends to change least in countries with high inequality, i.e. these countries do 
   
 
20
20
not redistribute income to a significant degree. Redistribution is most prevalent in richer 
economies, for which Forbes (2000) finds that higher inequality is associated with higher 
growth in the short run (which is not support for these models). There are no consistent 
changes in inequality in our sample, suggesting no consistent pattern of redistribution. 
Our evidence is that inequality has a consistent long-run negative effect on growth in 
developing countries. 
 
Social conflict models can be considered as alternative ‘socio-political economy’ models, 
in which inequality increases tension and conflict (perhaps because it does not lead to 
redistribution). Conflict and social tension discourage accumulation and therefore growth. 
If this type of model can be interpreted as representing elite rent-seeking and corruption as 
social conflict measured by inequality, then this is supported by the evidence for 
developing countries. Higher inequality results in lower growth, and the elites behind this 
effect withstand pressures for redistribution. 
 
Credit market models are based on the observation that the poor are constrained in their 
ability to access credit, therefore invest less and growth is lower. Our results do not test 
such hypotheses, even indirectly, although we do find that investment is a driver of 
growth. Future research could explore whether inequality does indeed constrain the level 
and/or productivity of investment. 
 
The X- efficiency models are appropriate to catch the direct effect of inequality in 
reducing incentives for effort, hence slowing dynamism and growth. Such effects should 
be observable in the short-run, but we find no evidence for a negative short-run 
relationship between inequality and growth in developing countries. 
 
Our results for developing countries suggest that inequality does tend to retard growth, 
whereas trade liberalisation tends to be associated with increased growth. This supports an 
interpretation of the ‘socio-political economy’ models whereby inequality captures rent-
seeking behaviour and associated distortions that constrain growth. We cannot infer, from the 
analysis here, that redistribution (reducing inequality) actually increases growth. We find no 
evidence of short-run (panel) effects of inequality on growth, perhaps because on average 
inequality does not change much. The results are consistent with the argument that it is not 
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inequality per se that retards growth but rather that inequality may encourage, or be a proxy 
for, the types of distortions that reduce economic performance. Trade liberalisation represents 
the removal of some such distortions (but not all), and has the hypothesised positive 
association with growth. This is not to claim that trade liberalisation ensures growth. Indeed, 
our results show that high transport costs (necessary for trade) constrain growth, as do 
unfavourable resource endowments. However, reducing trade distortions, ceteris paribus, is 
conducive to growth. Similarly, reducing the distortions associated with inequality would be 
conducive to growth. 
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Appendix: List of Variables and Data Sources  
 
GDP0 = GDP per capita in 1970 
GROWTH = average real per capita growth rate over 1970-1995 period 
INV = average investment to GDP ratio over 1970 – 1995 period, or for sub-periods in panel 
estimates 
SEC = secondary school enrolment rate in 1970. We also tried using percentage of primary 
school complete in total population (LPC) and percentage in primary school complete in 
population greater than 15 years (LPC15). 
SECR = secondary school enrolment rate at the start of each period in the panel. 
GINI = Gini coefficient of income inequality 
LandGini = Gini Land concentration Index 
NRE = Total Land per worker  
NBT = CIF/FOB factor 
OPEN = Proportion of the years between 1965 and 1990 that the economy is considered to be 
open by the criteria set by Sachs and Warner (1997).  
SSA = dummy variable with the value of unity for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and zero 
for all others. 
SW = Sachs and Warner index of trade liberalisation. 
SWaug = Augmented SW index (see Table A1). 
 
Sources are World Development Indicators 1997 and 2000 (CD-ROM), Barro–Lee data set, 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID), Sachs and Warner (1997), IFAD (2001) for 
LandGini, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995 (CIF/FOB factor)  
 
Table A1: Additional countries for Augmented Sachs-Warner Index 
 
 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 1 
Nepal 0 0 0 0 1 
Madagascar 0 0 0 1 1 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 1 1 
 
